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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------------------------
MARIUS BURKE, JR. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs- No. 18033 
NORMAN FARRELL 
Defendant and Appellant 
------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Respondent brought this matter in equity, 
demanding to have adjudged and decreed the relationship bet-
ween Defendant/Appellant and Plaintiff/Respondent in a cer-
tain business entitled 11 Fairfield Services", and to have 
Defendant/Appellant declared sole proprietor of said business 
during a certain period of time and to have determined the 
liabilities of the parties to each other and to third parties 
arising out of the operation of said business by Defendant/ 
Appellant and subsequent take-over of said business by Plain-
tiff/Respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 13,1981, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District 
Judge, of the Second Judicial District court in and for 
Weber county, found that Appellant operated the business 
entitled "Fairfield Services" as sole proprietor during the 
period from July 1, 1978 through December 31, 1979, and that 
the parties were no partners during said period; that Respond-
ent was entitled to possession of the business entitled "Fair-
field Services"; that Appellant had abandoned his interest 
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in "Fairfield Enterprises"; that Appellant had no further 
interest in a limited partnership entitled "Fairfield Enter-
prises"; that Appellant is liable for all unpaid liabilities 
which the business incurred during the period in question; 
and based on the accounting of all debits and credits between 
the parties, Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $10,565.51 
to Appellant or for his benefit to the creditors of the busi-
ness "Fairfield_Services". 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's Judg-
ment and Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 1, 1978, Respondent purchased certain 
premises upon which a service station business entitled 
11 Fairf ield Services" was conducted. Subsequent thereto, Respond-
ent formed a limited partnership entitled "Fairfield Enter-
prises", transferred said premises to said limited partnership. 
Before these occurrences Appellant and Respondent had known 
each other for some time and had discussed the purchase of 
the property and operation of the service station. rt has been 
the general understanding between them that Respondent would 
buy the property and Appellant would operate the service station 
business - R.176,177. 
During the month of June, 1978, Respondent helped Appellant 
to get started in tl:e business and describes the relationship 
between the parties during this transition period as a loose 
type of partnership arrangement, R.75,76. on er about July 1, 
1978, the parties formalized their arrangement, pursuant to 
their former understanding, whereby Respondent agreed to sell 
-2-
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to Appellant 50% of his interest in the limited partnership 
"Fairfield Enterprises", the owner of the premises, against 
certain installment payments over a period of 10 years, and 
Appellant entered into a lease of the premises with "Fa.irf ield 
Enterprises" as proprietor of the service station business, 
which was to be operated by him on the premises and was en-
titled "Fairfield Services". 
During the months April and May, 1979, Appellant exper-
ienced cash-flow problems in his service station business, 
R. 206i Appellant approached Respondent with the problem and 
Respondent agreed to help him out with a loan of $16,000 to 
"Fa.irfield Services",which was to be paid back out of the 
business proceeds; R 148. No other documents were executed or 
agreements made concerning said loan. (P Exhibit 12, 13). 
Later, during the summer of 1979, Appellant suggested 
to Respondent as general manager of "Fairfield Enterprises" 
the feasibility to increase the size of the building. He 
agreed to the addition of a cafe and a grocery store. After 
completion of the ~ddition, the premises were refinanced by 
i'Fairf ield Services" and the rent raised. 
Towards the end of 1979 the financial situation of the 
business deterioratedi Appellant fell into arrears with pay-
ments to "Fairfield Enterprises", suppliers, taxes, and the 
Respondent. Respondent examined the situation and found that 
there was not enough cash-flow to keep the business operative. 
R.77. The parties had a discussion and agreed that it would 
be in the best interest of the business and the parties, if 
Respondent would take over the business as per January 1, 1980; 
R. 76, a solution preferable to having to close the business. 
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The parties agreed that they would determine their 
debits and credits against each other - starting inventory, 
ending inventory, a.ccounts receivable, accounts paya.ble, 
Appellant's installment payments towards his interest in 
"Fairfield Enterprises", and others - and on the final bal-
ance Respondent would either pay to Appellant the difference 
or vice-versa.. R. 95, 155-157. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TO ALLOW ONE TO TAKE TITLE AS SECURITY FOR A LOAN 
TO LATER EMBARK ON A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD ONE WHO 
SOLICITED HIS SERVICES AS A LENDER IS ERROR. 
Appellant based his argument on the law in Graham vs. 
Street, 166 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1946). The facts in Graham vs. 
Street can be clearly distinguished from the facts as they 
appear in this case. In Graham vs. Street one Siegel had 
lead Graham and Street, two partners at that time, to believe 
that he lend them money and they were owing money to him for 
the purchase of a tractor, which he, in fact, had purchased 
himself and to which he had taken title. The court observed: 
When did Siegel change his intention to 
treat the deal as his personally after 
apparently starting out with papers made 
to the Siegel Finance Company? All these 
facts and others, when fitted together and 
made to illuminate each other, lead us to 
conclude that there was an intention on 
Siegel's pa.rt to get control of the "cat", 
which he knew he had led Graham to believe 
he was financing for the partnership of 
Graham and Street. By taking title himself 
and the notes from Graham and Street, he 
was in a. position to go either way what 
-4-
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events would dictate to be to his interest. 
If the tractor lost money, it would be a 
loan. If it made money, it would be his 
with a right to one third of the profits. 
(page 535). 
No such dual situation existed in this case. It was 
clear from the beginning to the end that Appellant owned 
and operated the business "Fairfield Services", that "Fair-
field Enterprises" owned the premises for which Appellant 
paid rent and that the money infusion by Respondent was a 
loan. During the months of April and May 1979, the business 
"Fairfield Services", operated by Appellant, experienced 
cash-flow problems. Appellant approached Respondent with 
the problem and Respondent agreed to help out with a loan 
of $16,000 in total with the understanding that it would be 
paid back out of the profits of the business. R. 95, 96; 
141, 142; 189, 190; R 198. 
The confusion arises from the fact that Respondent in 
his original summary of debits and credits pursuant to the 
take-over agreement between the parties, tried to hold 
Appellant personally responsible for his loan. The lower 
court disallowed said claim and found it was a business 
loan and since Respondent had come into possession of the 
business, he had no right to claim said loan from Appellant 
personally (see Memorandum Decision). 
POINT II 
THE BREACH OF A DUTY TO DISCLOSE BY THE 
DOMINANT PARTY IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
IS CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. 
The law as cited by Appellant is not disputed. However, 
the court, in examining the record, will find no breach of 
duty by Respondent. Appellant apparently refers to the re-
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lationship of the parties as members of "Fairfield Enter-
prises", a limited partnership, in which Respondent was 
the general partner and Appellant one limited partner. The 
facts are, that Appellant knew that the service station was 
first bought by Respondent personally and then transferred 
into "Fairfield Enterprises", of which he was offered a 
50% interest for payment of $25,000 over a period of 10 years, 
which amounted to "half the payment on the gas station", R.178. 
He testified, that the idea was for him to lease the station 
and that he would also buy into the bu~iness as a limited 
partner, R. 177. He knew that his rent to "Fairfield Enter-
prises" was based on the mortgage payments, which "Fairfield 
Enterprises" owed to the mortgageholder. R.196, 197. 
Respondent testified that the accountant for 11 Fairf ield Enter-
prises 11 did prepare an accounting. R. 11. Appellant himself 
testified, that he never asked for an accounting, because it 
was there and he had access to it. R. 207. Appellant knew 
how his total payrnents were allocated by Respondent and that 
first rent would come out of it, then equipment leases, land-
lord's share of profits and last his installment payments 
for his partnership interest in "Fairfield Enterprises".R.184 
through 186~ R. 209, 210. Respondent informed Appellant of 
his defaults. R. 76, 77. He knew the value of his business 
"Fairfield Services" at the time of the take-over and he 
knew the value of "Fairfield Enterprises", he testified to it. 
Ergo, on the facts as they appear in this case, Re-
spondent did not violate any duty to disclose and Appellant 
had knowledge of all material facts and no constructive fraud 
may be found. 
-6-
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The cases cited in support of Appellant's argument 
are clearly distinguishable. 
W. A. McMichael Construction co. vs. D. and w. Properties, 
Inc. 356, So.2d 1115 (La. App., 1978). Therein a partner 
intentionally and knowingly withheld information regarding 
a business opportunity, which he subsequently appropriated 
to himself. Plaintiff in this case testified that he would 
not have sold his interest if he would.have known of the 
business opportunity. 
Renshaw v. Tracy Loan arid Trust co., 49 P.2d403 
(Utah, 1935). The case holds, that on establishment of a 
fiduciary relationship and transactions between parties 
thereof, equity will presume fraud and place the burden of 
proving good faith and fairness on the dominant party. And 
further: 
It is always a question, therefore, of 
the actual relationship between the parties 
that must be inquired into and not whether 
the terms 11 f iduciary 11 , 11 confidential 11 or 
"trust" can, with some degree of reason, 
be applied to the relationship. 
Further, the court in "Lewis vs. Schafer", 163 Okl. 94, 
20 P.2d 1048, cited in the foregoing case, defines a con-
fidential rela.tionship on which a court may base a presumpt-
ion of fraud, as follows: 
A confidential relation arises by reason 
of kinship between the parties, or pro-
fessional, business, or social relations 
that would reasonably lead an ordinarily 
prudent person in the management of his 
affairs to repose that degree of confidence 
in the defendant which largely results in 
the substitution of the,will of the defend-
ant for that of the plaintiff in material 
matters involved in the transaction. 
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On the record of this case the court may find that 
the actual relationship between the parties hereto may not 
even justify the presumption of fraud. The relationship, 
although formally general partner and limited partner, was 
very close and most decisions were made together until the 
fall-out during the last few months of 1979. 
Also Blodgett vs. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1978) 
holds: 
Breach of duty by the dominant party in 
a confidential relationship may be re-
garded constructive fraud. 
However, the court further elaborates: 
Reasonable diligence on the part of the 
trustee, where the trustor proclaims his 
confusion about the meaning of the in-
struments he is asked to sign, may require 
a full disclosure and explanation, parti-
cularly when the instruments impose a 
heavier burden. 
Nowhere in his testimony does Appellant claim to have 
expressed confusion which remained unexplained by Respondent 
or that by execution of certain documents a heavier burden 
was imposed upon him than before and that he knew of. 
POINT III 
A COURT OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT ASSIST ONE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAS HIMSELF CREATED. A 
PARTY STEPPED IN FRAUD SHOULD HAVE NO 
EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
On the record the court may not find fraud either intent-
ional or by breach of a purported "confidential relationship". 
Respondent did not create any of the circumstances leading 
to his take-over of the business. Such circumstances were 
-8-
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created by Appellant's mismanagement of the business "Fair-
field Services" and his defaulting in his payment obligations. 
On the record in this case before the court, the court 
may find that no such relationship existed between the parties 
that would justify the presumption of constructive fraud. 
In any event, however, Respondent did not breach his duty to 
disclose. 
POINT IV 
THE CHOICE OF REMEDY BELONGS TO THE VICTIM 
OF THE FRAUD AND A CHOICE CANNOT BE FORCED 
UPON HIM .. 
Respondent was not defrauded and failed to establish 
even constructive fraud, which under the theory of the before 
cited cases requires (1) a "confidential relationship" and 
(2) a breach of duty. 
Atkinson vs. Marquart, 541 P.2d 556 (Ar.iz., 1975), 
which Appellant cites in support of Respondent's estimate 
of the value holds in detail; 
Owner may estimate value of his real or 
personal property, whether he is qualified 
as expert or not: the fact that owner may 
not be expert goes to the weight of testi-
mony, and not competency. 
Respondent was not qualified as an expert. The case 
further holds with regard to the issue of breach of fiduciary 
duty: 
A director does not breach his fiduciary 
duty so long as he acts honestly and in 
good faith and breaches no specific duty 
owing to the corporation. 
Respondent's action may be measured against this 
holding and no breach of duty may be found. 
-9-
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POINT V 
IT IS ERROR TO FIND AN ABANDONMENT OF 
PROPERTY BASED ON AN AGREEMENT PROCURED 
BY FRAUD AND WHERE THE DEFRAUDED PARTY 
DOES NOT KNOW THE TRUE VALUE OF WHAT HE 
SUPPOSEDLY ABANDONS. 
As a result of the discussions between the parties in 
December 1979, Appellant abandoned his interest in the busi-
ness entitled "Fairfield Services" - R.76 through 78 - on 
the terms that "we would go through it and determine where 
the debits and credits were and he would either be paying 
me money or I would be paying him money". Plaintiff's testi-
mony R.95, 155, 160, 162. Respondent was well aware of the 
value of the business, of the accounts receivable, accounts 
payable, inventory,although his figures were later proven 
far too optimistic. Defendant's Exhibit 6, 7, and R. 214, 
Respondent not only knew the value of the property that he 
abandoned, but according to his testimony he also saw no other 
way out of his predicament than turning it over to the Re-
spondent. R. 197. 
Regarding Appellant's interest in the limited partner-
ship "Fairfield Enterprises", Respondent had informed him of 
his default under the purchasing agreement before the take-
over of the business, R. 233, and Appell~nt himself testified 
that Respondent offered to return to him as credit the sum 
of $2,300, which Appellant had paid toward the purchase of 
his interest in "Fairfield Enterprises", the land owner. R.199. 
Nowhere does the record show that Appellant objected to that 
proposal. Respondent abandoned his interest in the limited 
partnership for the credit of $2,300, which he had paid in. 
-10-
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In the event the court cannot find abandonment, Appell-
ant lost his interest in said partnership by defaulting on 
his installment payments and cancellation in accordance 
with the purchase agreement. He confirmed in his testimony 
as correct, Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, showing his total payments 
towards the purchase of his interest and his arrears. R.215. 
Pursuant to the contract for the Sale of a Limited Partner-
ship Agreement - Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 - Respondent cancelled 
said agreement - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 - and was entitled 
to do so. 
POINT VI 
IT IS NOT REQUIRED THAT A SERIES OF TRANS-
ACTIONS SO CLOSELY RELATED IN TIME AND FACT 
TO BE GROUPED AND COMPARTMENTALIZED TO 
SEPARATE THEIR LEGAL EFFECT. 
The record repeatedly shows that Appellant understood 
and clearly knew the different business entities, their 
relations to each other and his relation to either one of 




A. He was saying that he was thinking of 
buying a service-station and I would be 
interested in running it. 
Q. was this put to you that he would buy it, 
or that both of you were buying it, or what 
were you both going to do with this gas 
station? 
A. Okay, the idea was to lease it and also 
to buy into the business as a partner. 
A. Yes, he told me that he would buy it and 
then I would buy into the business, into 
the company, which was "Fairfield Enterprises". 
-11-
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Also R.201 
R. 204, 205: Q. But you were aware that you, Norman 
Farrell, had a lease with a landlord, 
namely Fairfield Enterprises, who owns 
the business, is that right? 
A. Right, and that's the way I looked at 
it. 
Q. very good. So there were two levels. 
You as the tenant and 11 Fairfield Enter-
prises as the landlord~ is that correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you were acquiring a fifty % interest 
in the landlord, "is that correct 11 ? 
A. That is right. 
Appellant would like to see all entities treated as one 
but they were distinct and the court ma.y not make up a rela-
tionship between the parties that did not exist and the 
parties did not intent. 
The record shows that Respondent did not deprive Appellant 
of the fruits of his labor. The fact is, that Appellant assumed 
a normal business risk by opera.ting "Fairfield Services" and 
failed. He never had a clear picture of the actual profit 
situation. He looked at the business on a cash-flow basis. 
R. 206. When questioned about the improvement of the business 
under his management, he testified that the buildup of his 
business consisted of an increase in accounts receivables 
from $8,000 to $33,000 over a six months period. At the same 
time he admits that an increase in accounts receivable does 
not actually reflect the health of a business, R. 206, and 
that as a result of the increase in accounts receivable he 
got into a cash-flow problem. R. 190. In the first incident 
-12-
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in April/May 1979 this problem was solved by an infusion 
of $16,000 by Respondent. The situation repeated itself 
towards the end of the year - accounts payable $38,112.95; 
accounts receivable $16,744.99 - and when no additional work-
ing capital could be obtained because Respondent was financi-
ally exhausted, he saw no other way out than turning the 
business over to Respondent instead of closing it down. 
R. 197. He did not leave the business empty-handed as he 
argues. Mr. West, the accountant during part of the period 
of Appellant's operation of the business, testified on re-
buttal that Appellant, for example, drew in October-November 
basically $1,900 a month - $1,000 into savings, $900 direct 
draw - and draws in September and each of the months of 
approximately $1,900 a month. R. 227, 228. Appellant was 
credited for his work done on the improvements to the premises 
for material and labor. R. 208. Respondent bought a home 
during the period in question and testifies to its financing 
as follows: R. 212. Respondent clearly drew money from the 
business for the purchase of his home~ 
Q. Now when you bought that house you have testi-
f ied to, did you actually buy it, your home? 
A. With my money? 
Q. Did you actually buy it? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay - and you said you had no money for the 
down-payment? 
A. At that timei noc.. 
Q. where did you get the money for the down-payment? 
A. I was expecting all the accounts receivable to 
come back, you know, in the later months. And 
I could foresee that I had a certain amount of 
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money that I could use, considering that ·I 
didn't get a pay-check every year, every week 
you know~ so I thought to myself, well this 
could be a pay-check to me. 
What goodies did Respondent get when he took over the 
business "Fairfield Services" and Appellant abandoned his 
interest in the limited partnership "Fairfield Enterprises?" 
He, through his interest in "Fairfield Enterprises", again 
became the full owner of the premises which he had bought 
and for which he had made the total down-payment in the 
first place. For the improvement a higher mortgage was assumed. 
Material and labor had been supplied by his company. For 
his small contribution to the improvements Appellant was 
credited. The business showed $16,744.99 accounts receivable, 
of which only about $12,000 were collectible, against 
$38,112.95 accounts payable, $24,764.80 inventory, and con-
siderable tax liabilities. After his take-over he had to 
invest an additional $50,000 to keep the business afloat. 
R. 162. 
POINT VII 
IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE FACT FINDER 
TO HEAR EVIDENCE, MAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND DRAW INFRENCES AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THEREFROM TO SUPPORT ITS JUDGMENT. 
The decision of the lower court is based on its finqings 
of fact and conclusions of law and that it is its prero-
gative. Blodgett vs. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1978). 
Justice Crockett in the same case opines further: 
that we should not presume to evaluate 
the evidence, but that should be done 
at trial. 
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It is only: 
When evidence is non-conflicting and 
undisputed and permits only one conclu-
sion, finding or conclusion by trial 
court contrary thereto is not binding 
on appeal, and, where undisputed facts 
are conclusive of issue between parties, 
reviewing court will order judgment 
entered as required by facts and law. 
(see Woodmar vs. Knight, 380P.2d 222, 
Idaho,1963). 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
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flor Respondent 
I hereby certify that I served two full, true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to DALE E. STRAT-
FORD, Esq., Attorney for Appellant, at 1218 First Security 
Bank Building, Ogden, Utah, 84401, by U. S. Regular Mail, 
postage prepaid, this 18t'\4.day of January, 1982. 
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